By Monty A. McIntyre, Esq.
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July 31, 2024
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT Arbitration Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2024) _ Cal.5th _ , 2024 WL 1319134: The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal, which had affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s complaint alleging negligence and elder abuse. Plaintiff signed a power of attorney for health care appointing his nephew, Mark Harrod, as his “health care agent” to make “health care decisions” should plaintiff’s primary physician find plaintiff unable to make those decisions himself. Plaintiff later fell, broke a femur, became unable to walk and was admitted to defendant skilled nursing facility to obtain living assistance and rehabilitative treatment. During the admission process Mark Harrod signed two agreements. The first was an admission agreement that was state-mandated and unalterable. The second was an arbitration agreement. The California Supreme Court concluded that the execution of the optional contract for arbitration was not a health care decision within the health care agent’s authority, and defendant’s owners and operators could not rely on the agent’s execution of the second agreement to compel arbitration of claims arising from the principal’s alleged maltreatment alleged in his complaint. (March 28, 2024.) Civil Procedure TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) _ Cal.5th _ , 2024 WL 763422: The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision that affirmed the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for relief from waiver of a jury trial. Plaintiff did not make a jury fee deposit because defendant did so. On the day of trial, defendant said he was waiving his request for a jury trial. Plaintiff asked for a jury trial and offered to post the jury fee deposit. The trial court denied this request concluding that plaintiff had waived its right to a jury trial by not timely depositing the jury fee deposit. (Code of Civil Procedure, section 631.) Although the trial court observed that plaintiff could challenge the ruling by filing a petition for an extraordinary writ, plaintiff did not do so. After a seven day bench trial the trial court found against plaintiff. The California Supreme Court concluded that a trial court is not required to always grant relief from a jury waiver if proceeding with a jury would not cause hardship to other parties or to the trial court. A request for relief from jury waiver always calls for consideration of multiple factors in addition to hardship, including the timeliness of the request and the reasons supporting the request. The California Supreme Court also concluded that when a litigant challenges the denial of relief from jury waiver for the first time on appeal of the judgment of the trial court, where the constitutional right of jury trial has been validly waived, prejudice from the denial of section 631(g) relief will not be presumed but must be shown. (February 26, 2024.) CALIFORNIA COURTS OF APPEAL Arbitration Davis v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2024) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2024 WL 1130508: The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in plaintiffs’ action for claims including violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act; Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.) regarding a Nissan with an allegedly defective transmission. The Court of Appeal, joining with four other Court of Appeal decisions that had rejected Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, and noting the California Supreme Court has granted review to resolve the conflict, affirmed the trial court. (C.A. 4th, March 15, 2024.) Attorney Fees Gramajo v. Joe’s Pizza on Sunset, Inc. (2024) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2024 WL 1250214: The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s request for attorney fees of $296,920 and costs in the amount of $26,932.84 under Labor Code section 1194(a) after the jury awarded plaintiff $7,659.93 in plaintiff’s action for Labor Code violations in connection with plaintiff’s work as a pizza delivery driver. Relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 1033(a), which gives trial courts discretion to deny prevailing plaintiffs their litigation costs when plaintiffs file their case as an unlimited civil proceeding but only recover an amount available in a limited civil case, the trial court denied all attorney fees and costs, concluding that plaintiff’s counsel severely over-litigated the case and the requested fees and costs were grossly disproportional to plaintiff’s limited trial success. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding the trial court did not have discretion to deny plaintiff’s fees and costs in their entirety under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033(a), and plaintiff was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs. (C.A. 2nd, March 25, 2024.) Civil Procedure Ayers v. FCA US, LLC (2024) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2024 WL 805660: The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding plaintiff attorney fees and costs totaling $187,747.75 after defendant accepted plaintiff’s January 2021 Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to settle plaintiff’s “lemon law” causes of action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly; Civil Code section 1790 et seq.) for $125,000 plus costs, expenses and attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d). Before the settlement, the parties had exchanged earlier 998 offers, including a 998 offer from defendant in February 2018 to settle for $143,498. The trial court rejected defendant’s arguments that the February 2018 998 offer should have stopped plaintiff’s ability to collect attorney fees, concluding that section 998’s limitations on expense and cost recovery do not apply when the case is resolved by a pretrial settlement, and concluding that an intervening change in law that reduced the maximum amount plaintiff could recover at trial exempted him from the usual consequences of section 998. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that Section 998 applies to awards of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d), section 998 applies even where the litigation is terminated by settlement, and section 998 makes no exception for an intervening change in law. The case was remanded and the trial court was instructed to enter a new judgment exclusive of any costs, as such term is used in section 1032(b), incurred by plaintiff after the date of defendant’s February 16, 2018 section 998 offer. (C.A. 2nd, February 27, 2024.) Torts Fraser v. Farvid (2024) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2024 WL 510111: The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendant landlord’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury found for plaintiff against defendant and awarded plaintiff $600,000 for the injuries he suffered after he was attacked by two pit bulls who escaped from a single-family residence. Under California law a landlord is only liable if they have actual knowledge that the dog of a tenant is dangerous. In this case, while the evidence established the landlords knew there were dogs on the property, plaintiff failed to prove that defendants had actual knowledge the dogs were dangerous. (C.A. 2nd, February 9, 2024.) Settlement BTHHM Berkeley, LLC, et al. v. Johnston (2024) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2024 WL 1336433: The Court of Appeal affirmed in part, and struck in part, the trial court’s order enforcing a settlement term sheet and entering judgment against defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (section 664.6). The Court of Appeal affirmed in part, concluding that the settlement term sheet was enforceable under section 664.6, the liquidated damages of $250,000 was not unreasonably out of proportion to the $2.2 million settlement, and defendant failed to show the liquidated damages provision was unreasonable under the circumstances as required by Civil Code section 1671(b). However, the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. Section 664.6 authorizes a trial court to enter a judgment reflecting the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement—nothing more, and nothing less. Prejudgment interest is not a cost, but an element of damages. By awarding prejudgment interest to compensate plaintiff for damages it suffered by virtue of defendant’s failure to pay, the trial court entered a judgment that differed materially from the terms of the parties’ agreement, and to that extent it was unauthorized. The portion of the judgment providing for prejudgment interest was stricken. (C.A. 1st, March 28, 2024.)